Colonel Edward Lansdale (second from left) with C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles and United States Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining and C.I.A. Deputy Director Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell at The Pentagon in 1955. U.S. Air Force Archive.
During the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the 1950s, the CIA employed psychological warfare to weaken insurgents in the Philippines. One of its most bizarre yet effective strategies was exploiting Filipino folklore, particularly the legend of the aswang—a mythical vampire-like creature feared across the country. By tapping into deep-seated cultural fears, U.S. intelligence operatives instilled paranoia among Huk fighters, causing them to abandon their positions without direct military engagement.
The Hukbalahap (Huk) movement originally formed as an anti-Japanese resistance group during World War II. However, after the war, the Huks turned against the Philippine government. By 1950, the rebellion had escalated into a full-scale communist insurgency, with the Huks expanding their influence, establishing regional governments, collecting taxes, and enforcing their own laws. Their growing strength posed a serious threat to government stability, prompting U.S. intervention.
Role of Edward Lansdale
Recognizing the urgency, Philippine President Elpidio Quirino requested the transfer of Edward Lansdale, a U.S. Army intelligence officer, to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), Philippines. His mission: to assist the intelligence services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating the Huk insurgency.
Quirino was familiar with Lansdale’s expertise in psychological warfare and counterinsurgency, having been introduced to him through U.S. military and diplomatic channels. Lansdale had already earned a strong reputation for innovative intelligence strategies, having worked closely with Filipino officials during previous assignments in the country. His success in rebuilding the Philippine Army’s intelligence services and crafting effective psychological operations made him an ideal candidate to help suppress the rebellion.
Lansdale, an experienced intelligence officer, was commissioned into the U.S. Army in 1943 and assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The OSS—a precursor to the CIA—was responsible for covert operations, espionage, and psychological warfare. Lansdale’s intelligence expertise earned him a promotion to major, and he extended his tour in the Philippines until 1948, assisting with postwar reconstruction efforts.
During this period, Lansdale played a critical role in rebuilding the Philippine Army’s intelligence network. He worked to resolve cases involving large numbers of prisoners of war, ensuring stability in the postwar Philippines. Due to his specialization in intelligence operations, he transferred to the U.S. Air Force in 1947, following its establishment as an independent service, assuming greater responsibilities in strategic intelligence planning.
Following his departure from the Philippines in 1948, Lansdale became an instructor at the Strategic Intelligence School at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, where he taught courses in counterinsurgency and psychological operations. His expertise earned him a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1949, further solidifying his leadership in psychological warfare
CIA’s Psychological Warfare Strategy
The CIA, under the direction of Lansdale, recognized that conventional military force alone would not be sufficient to defeat the Huk insurgency. Lansdale understood the power of messaging and psychological influence. His approach to counterinsurgency was unique—he combined traditional military strategies with cultural manipulation, seeking to undermine the enemy’s morale by exploiting superstitions and folklore.
Lansdale had a background in advertising, which influenced his ability to craft persuasive narratives. He believed that psychological operations (PSYOPS) could be just as effective as direct combat, particularly when targeting deep-seated fears within a population.
Among the various PSYOPS Lansdale implemented, one of the most infamous was the exploitation of the aswang legend. This supernatural figure, deeply feared in rural Philippines, was transformed into a tool of psychological warfare. Lansdale believed that fear rooted in cultural beliefs was more potent than conventional propaganda. By tapping into deep-seated superstitions, he aimed to instill paranoia among Huk fighters, making them hesitant to remain in rebel-controlled areas and ultimately diminishing their effectiveness as an insurgent force.
The Aswang Myth
The aswang is one of the most feared creatures in Filipino mythology. Often described as a vampire-like monster, it is believed to drain the blood of its victims, typically isolated travelers or villagers wandering at night. The legend of the aswang varies across different regions, with some versions depicting it as a shape-shifting predator, capable of transforming into animals such as dogs, pigs, or birds.
For centuries, Filipinos—especially those in rural communities—feared the aswang. Stories of mysterious disappearances, bloodless corpses, and shadowy figures lurking in the forests reinforced the belief that the creature was real. The fear of encountering an aswang was so strong that people avoided traveling alone at night, and many practiced rituals to ward off the creature. Recognizing the psychological power of this myth, Lansdale and the CIA saw an opportunity to weaponize Filipino superstition against the Huks.
The Aswang Operation
Lansdale’s team carefully crafted a psychological warfare (PSYWAR) campaign that played on the fear of the aswang. They spread rumors among villagers that an aswang was lurking in the hills where the Huks were stationed. These rumors were designed to reach Huk fighters, who relied on local communities for food and shelter. As fear spread, Lansdale’s team took their deception a step further by staging a gruesome scene to make the myth appear real.
One night, a Huk patrol was ambushed, and the last soldier in the group was silently captured. His body was then punctured with two vampire-like holes, drained of blood, and left on a trail for his comrades to find. When the remaining Huk fighters discovered their bloodless comrade, panic spread through their ranks. The sight of a corpse drained of blood, combined with the rumors circulating in the villages, convinced many that the aswang had claimed one of their own. Fearing that they would be next, many Huk fighters fled the area, abandoning their positions and weakening their resistance.
The aswang PSYWAR tactic proved to be remarkably effective in disrupting Huk operations. By leveraging deep-seated cultural fears, Lansdale’s approach demonstrated that psychological manipulation could be just as powerful as conventional warfare. The success of this operation contributed to the eventual defeat of the Huk rebellion, as fear and paranoia eroded the insurgents’ ability to organize and fight effectively.
The Hukbalahap Rebellion officially ended in 1954, when Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered to the Philippine government. While military force played a major role in the defeat of the Huks, psychological operations such as the aswang campaign contributed to their eventual collapse.
Legacy
Lansdale’s PSYWAR strategies in the Philippines influenced U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, where similar psychological operations were used against the Viet Cong. However, as the Vietnam War escalated, conventional military strategies overshadowed Lansdale’s psywar approach, limiting its effectiveness in a larger-scale conflict.
Beyond military applications, Lansdale’s career left a lasting mark on PSYWAR theory. His unconventional tactics proved that cultural manipulation and weaponized superstition could alter the trajectory of a war. His life inspired fictional characters, including Colonel Edwin Hillandale in The Ugly American and William Pyle in The Quiet American. Lansdale continued advising U.S. policymakers on counterinsurgency until his retirement in 1963. He was promoted to Major General in the U.S. Air Force before retiring. He passed away in 1987, leaving behind a legacy of PSYWAR innovations.
The CIA’s use of folklore-based psywar remains one of the most bizarre yet effective psychological operations in military history. It highlights how deeply cultural beliefs can be weaponized in warfare, demonstrating that fear—whether real or imagined—can be a powerful tool in shaping the outcome of conflicts.
Folklore remains a powerful tool in contemporary PSYOPS because it taps into deep-seated cultural beliefs, shaping perceptions and influencing behavior in ways that traditional propaganda often cannot. In modern warfare, political influence campaigns, and even corporate marketing, folklore can be harnessed to achieve strategic objectives. Its power lies in its emotional and cultural resonance, which makes it a unique weapon for shaping perceptions and manipulating behavior.
Resource
Central Intelligence Agency
CIA.gov